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INTRODUCTION
A.

Background

For nearly two decades, much of environmental policy-making
at the federal level in the United States has been paralyzed. Since the
Republicans captured both houses of Congress in 1994 and proposed the
Contract with America, the Bush presidency in the first decade of the
century, and most recently, the notorious Congressional stalemate coinciding with the rise of the Tea Party, national legislative and regulatory
action has been conspicuously limited. The absence of federal environmental ambition, however, has led to an opposite development: it has
spurred legislative and regulatory activity on subfederal levels of policymaking. Since the 1990s, state level environmental policy has, in many
places, been filling the gaps left by U.S. federal authorities.
While state-level environmental policies are relatively well known
and researched,1 a level of government below that—cities—remains less

1

See, e.g., EVAN J. RINGQUIST, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AT THE STATE LEVEL: POLITICS
AND PROGRESS IN CONTROLLING POLLUTION (1993); Matthew Potoski & Neal D. Woods,
Dimensions of State Environmental Policies, 30 POL. STUD. J. 2, 208 (2002).
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well-charted territory. Considering how urbanization has long been the
prominent aspect of demographic and economic developments globally,
this seems striking.2 Most countries’ development is significantly driven
by one or more metropolitan regions, in which they are connected to by
the globalized economy. New York City, Los Angeles, San Jose, and Chicago
are leading economic drivers in the United States.3 The phenomenon is
in no way limited to the United States of course, with London, Helsinki,
Tokyo and Shanghai, for example, acting as engines in their respective
national economies.4 More broadly, interest in the role of cities as a point
of leverage in addressing not just traditional local environmental challenges such as land use, but broader issues such as climate change and
sustainability more generally, has mushroomed.5 The developments raise
the question: can cities also play a role in environmental policy-making?
What kind of limitations could the cities face in fulfilling such role?
B.

The Research Questions and the Thesis

While an inquiry to the role of cities in environmental policy-making
seems salient in practical terms, it also presents us with an intriguing
methodological setup. On the one hand, the focus on cities points on the
side of policy-making towards the seminal, public choice-based theory of
Paul E. Peterson. Peterson famously argued in his book, City Limits, that
city-level policies are structurally limited to those that further the city’s
economic development. It seems, however, that there has not been scholarly attempts to assess how that theory of informal economic limits could
instruct us in terms of modern environmental policy-making.
On the other hand, from the perspective of law, the development of
subnational rules is formally limited by the applicable constitutional provisions. Although the constitutional limits of states have been explored in
detail, much less attention has been devoted to the constraints that the
American federal system may set on innovative, environmentally progressive cities and municipalities. Our investigation of these formal limitations on city-level environmental policy-making focuses on economic
2

Richard C. Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, and the Free Trade Constitution,
94 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1100 (2008). In the United States, the urban population has increased
from less than 20% in the 1860s to over 80% in 2000. Id. at 1103.
3
Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic
City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 504–05 (2009).
4
Id.
5
See, e.g., C40 CITIES CLIMATE LEADERSHIP GROUP, http://www.c40.org/ [http://perma.cc
/6ND4-SNQ3] (last visited Nov. 12, 2015).

202

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 40:199

constitutional law. Economic constitutional law refers in this Article to
those rules that are quintessential in preventing subfederal jurisdictions
from enacting measures that hinder the free interstate movement of goods,
services, or capital on a common market. In the constitutional setting of
the United States, economic constitutional law in this sense means the
Dormant Commerce Clause,6 which hence is the focal point of our interest.
Moreover, although the application of public choice theory and
constitutional law to sub-state level environmental policy seems interesting separately, it is their intersection that is the principal layer of novelty
in our analysis. The interrelationship between public choice and law has
of course matured into a major strand of research,7 and there are scholars
that have previously analyzed the links between public choice theory and
constitutional law. The analysis has, however, focused on explaining federal and state-level issues: Congressional decision-making, the role of the
judiciary in the federal system (in particular the scope of statutory interpretation), or the scope of administrative law (delegation of decisionmaking to administrative agencies).8 Also, where multistate commercial
activity,9 or the Dormant Commerce Clause more specifically,10 has been
under scrutiny, the approach has been different from the Petersonian, local
level angle in this Article. Together, the dual perspective of Peterson’s
theory of city limits and the constitutional law of the Dormant Commerce
Clause can be used as a novel analytical framework to depict the informal and formal limits on city-level environmental policies. Our scrutiny
6

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
DANIEL A. FARBER & ANNE JOSEPH O’CONNELL, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE
AND LAW 1–9 (2010).
8
See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1971); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1998); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,
19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the
Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1992); David B. Spence, Administrative Law
and Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J.
ON REG. 407 (1997); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97 (2000); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation,
2 J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
9
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE (1993) (investigating takings).
10
See, e.g., Jim Rossi, The Political Economy of Energy and Its Implications for Climate
Change Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 379, 421–24 (2009); Ali Badawi, Unceasing Animosities
and the Public Tranquility: Political Market Failure and the Scope of the Commerce Power,
91 CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2003); Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency, the Commerce
Clause, and the Sherman Act: Why We Should Follow a Consistent Free-Market Policy,
44 EMORY L.J. 1227 (1995); Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical
Analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2003).
7
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therefore, also contributes to filling a gap in interdisciplinary research
and legal theory. Our research confirms that there are numerous overlaps
between the two disciplinary approaches on sub-state level, and that such
overlaps are instructive for better understanding the challenges of mitigating environmental impacts. By focusing at the local level, the work thereby
complements the public choice and law-based research on the environmental field of, for example, Professor Richard Revesz.11
Our analysis reveals that cities may, in fact, be relatively unconstrained in conducting environmental policy at the local level. The limits
that public choice and constitutional law impose seem in most respects
quite reasonable and sensible, both for the cities themselves as well as
their larger federal settings. This is an optimistic conclusion, because it
means that even in the current global context of international environmental policy-making, one should not forget to think outside—and more
specifically underneath—the box. There may be fewer constraints than
previously thought for identifying and fully exploiting the potential that
exists for a specific environmental policy under the federal and state governments at the city level.
Further, this Article argues that Peterson’s theory and constitutional economic law also offer coherent guidance on the long-term prosperity of cities in the global setting. The cities seem likely to remain driven
by a focus on economic development policies, which in turn is well aligned
with the constitutional efforts to remove discrimination and protectionism
in commerce and trade.
C.

City Limits—a Classic Theory of Public Choice and
Urban Policy

The economist Charles Tiebout12 argued that “the consumer-voter
may be viewed as picking that community which best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods.”13 In other words, the provision of public
goods forms a market. In this market, individuals are rational and selfinterested, so an important (but certainly not exclusive) motivation driving

11

Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis,
115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001).
12
Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. OF POL. ECON. 416 (1956);
see also RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC
ECONOMY (1959).
13
Tiebout, supra note 12, at 418.
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their behavior is the maximization of utility.14 In Tiebout’s account, residents seek communities with the highest ratio of benefits (services) to
costs (taxes)—“they vote with their feet.”15 The public authorities (i.e., local
governments) compete for the economic resources of the utility-seeking
individuals: tax-paying residents and companies. Peterson’s City Limits16
is perhaps the most influential extension of Tiebout’s theory. Peterson
applied Tiebout’s approach to characterize the forces that shape the provision and politics of municipal goods and services. Peterson claimed that
because of such intercity competition for economic resources, the cities
must inevitably pursue policies that focus on economic development.17 The
market for public goods thus is the factor that predominantly (yet not exclusively) explains the policies that cities choose to follow. Even if one did
not agree with Peterson’s conclusions, his theory, like many public choice
approaches, seems useful as an analytical method to further understand
the “how” in policy-making—in this case, how the local level environmental
policies may or may not be constrained.18
The political-economic context and the scholarship on public choice
and urban public policy have obviously evolved since Peterson’s book was
written in 1981. Peterson’s structurally deterministic theses have also
received considerable criticism, and his focus on economic development
as the factor explaining city policies has been questioned. Alternative
14

There is considerable debate amongst the public choice scholars about the theory even
at this fundamental level. See, e.g., MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC
CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 243–95 (2009) (explaining the separate traditions). The right wing Chicago tradition is according to them concerned over the legislative market failure. Due to skepticism about the statutory self-interest of the legislator
(along “the Wilson-Hayes model”), they argue that the judiciary should interpret legislation
narrowly. The left wing, institutionalist tradition of Virginia reflects more the “Legal Process School” work developed by Henry M. Hart and Albert M. Sacks, whereby the legislative
bargaining process and judiciary are primarily motivated by the public interest (i.e., the
common good). The Chicago tradition includes scholars and/or judges such as Frank
Easterbrook, Jonathan Macey, Richard Posner, and Kenneth Shepsle. Stearns and Zywicki
associate the Virginia tradition with (for example) Daniel Farber, Philip Frickey, William
Eskridge, and Einer Elhauge.
One may also note that “public choice” as a field is described by different names and
consists various subtheories, such as interest group theory, rational choice theory, game
theory, social choice theory as well as various applications of behavioral theory.
15
Tiebout, supra note 12, at 418.
16
See PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (1981).
17
Id. at 18–19.
18
Thomas S. Ulen, Economic and Public-Choice Forces in Federalism, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV.
921, 951 (1998); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 99–100 (2000).

2015]

THINKING UNDER THE BOX

205

explanations of city behavior have been observed19 to vary from the earlier
theories on community power elite,20 pluralist interests,21 and growth machine interests,22 to later studies on regime analyses23 and interest group
coalitions,24 as well as professional bureaucrats,25 and elected officials.26
The criticism does not nonetheless alter the fact that Peterson’s book remains a seminal contribution, and there are many scholars who still attest
to its main findings.27 It is obvious that public choice theory, as any other
model or theory, has its strengths and weaknesses, and this Article does
not assess the validity of Peterson’s theory as such. Rather, we believe
(and experienced empirically) that when used critically, it still makes for
an interesting, previously unexplored analytical framework to enrich insights in the area of our research: environmental policy and law.
D.

The Constitutional Model of Regulatory Competition

Tiebout’s analysis has intriguing parallels in the legal sphere with
what may be titled the constitutional models, that is, with overarching
conceptions of how constitutional law should be fashioned or interpreted,
in this context, with respect to trade and commerce.
In the constitutional model of regulatory competition,28 the individual lower-level governments (local governments29 within states, states
19

Victoria Basolo & Chihyen Huang, Cities and Economic Development—Does the City
Limits Story Still Apply?, 15 ECON. DEV. Q. 327 (2001).
20
See, e.g., FLOYD HUNTER, COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE (1953); M. KENT JENNINGS,
COMMUNITY INFLUENTIALS (1964); and NELSON POLSBY, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY (1963).
21
See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1961); AARON WILDAVSKY, LEADERSHIP IN A
SMALL TOWN (1964).
22
See, e.g., Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine, 82 AM. J. OF SOC. 309 (1976).
23
See, e.g., MICHAEL KEATING, COMPARATIVE URBAN POLITICS: POWER AND THE CITY IN
THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, BRITAIN AND FRANCE (1991).
24
See, e.g., TERRY N. CLARK & LORNA C. FERGUSON, CITY MONEY: POLITICAL PROCESSES,
FISCAL STRAIN, AND RETRENCHMENT (1983).
25
See, e.g., Lynn M. Appleton & Terry N. Clark, Coping in American Cities: Fiscal Austerity
and Urban Innovations in the 1980s, in URBAN INNOVATION AND AUTONOMY 31 (Susan E.
Clarke ed., 1989).
26
See, e.g., Thomas Longoria Jr., Empirical Analysis of the City Limits Typology, 30 URB.
AFF. REV. 102 (1994); Martin Saiz, Mayoral Perceptions of Developmental and Redistributive Policies: A Cross-National Perspective, 34 URB. AFF. REV. 820 (1999).
27
Schragger, supra note 3, at 489.
28
Note that the term regulatory competition is in no way linked with competition (antitrust) law.
29
In this Article, the terms city, municipality and local government are used interchangeably. In other contexts, these distinctions may be important.
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within federations) are largely self-determinant in terms of law-making.30
They are constitutionally empowered to define the laws and policies within
their jurisdictions in specific areas such as environmental protection.31
In full-blown regulatory competition, no common uniform legislation exists, save for the general, systemic rules of the higher level constitution(s).32
In line with Tiebout’s idea of a public goods market, the lower-level jurisdictions set up legal systems that are as inviting as possible to various
groups of stakeholders (consumers, producers, merchants, etc.).33 The
legal systems enter into a “regulatory competition” for the resources that
such stakeholders represent or provide.34 Such competition can drive the
substantive standards either upwards (race to the top) or downwards (race
to the bottom), depending on the preferences of the stakeholders and the
mobility of the resources in question.35 This is in essence also what Tiebout
and Peterson are claiming.
The alternative to the constitutional model of regulatory competition is harmonization.36 In the harmonization model, the hierarchically
higher level government sets a common standard for the lower levels of
government.37 The common standard, in this view, may increase aggregate welfare beyond what can be achieved through the varying levels of
the decentralized regulatory competition approach.38 In the United States,
harmonization can be achieved through federal legislation.
The proponents of the regulatory competition approach argue for
a wide autonomy for the individual, lower level units of government. For
them, harmonization39 beyond the mere leveling of the playing field is
unwarranted paternalism, whereby particular policies, such as state level
environmental protection measures, are forced upon an unwilling minority
of states and/or municipalities without any tangible benefits.40 Regulatory
30

Tiebout, supra note 12, at 418.
Id. at 419–20.
32
See PETERSON, supra note 16, at 18.
33
Tiebout, supra note 12, at 420–21.
34
Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Regulatory Co-opetition, 30 J. INT’L ECON. L. 235,
252 (2000).
35
See, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 16, at 18–20.
36
Esty & Geradin, supra note 34, at 235–36.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
See discussion infra Introduction. There are also many kinds of combinations of the
“regulatory competition” and “harmonization” models. A society’s choice of a particular constitutional model should aim at optimizing its ability to reach the desired societal objectives.
40
Robert E. Hudec, Differences in National Environmental Standards: the Level-PlayingField Dimension, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 7–8 (1996).
31
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competition entails a libertarian view on innovation, as well as sensitivity
to local diversity.41 Local communities can be seen as the laboratories of democracy that engage in novel social experiments, just as Justice Brandeis
observed states to be already doing in the 1930s.42
If states seemed like the laboratories of democracy in the United
States of the 1930s,43 it would appear that the ubiquity of information and
the ensuing small-scale empowerment has expanded the notion to local
authorities: considerable regulatory experimentation on complicated matters may take place in the local level administrations. The information
flow enables better use to be made of such innovative experimentation.
The positive impacts of green roof standards on greenhouse gas emissions,
energy efficiency, and local air and noise pollution in the German city of
Stuttgart quickly finds applications in New York, Vancouver, and beyond.44
Regulatory experimentation by local authorities can provide the
basis for effective legislation.45 Effective legislation, then again, translates
into welfare gains, which can potentially be multiplied if the innovative
legislation can be applied on the level of the higher governance or replicated in other jurisdictions.46 As noted, the regulatory competition strand
of constitutional law theory appears to resonate well with the theories of
Tiebout and Peterson in explaining the structure and objectives of local
governance. The constitution must grant local authorities power to regulate; otherwise, they cannot engage in the regulatory competition. The
views on the appropriate grant of powers can reflect one’s degree of libertarian/federalist principles or, more pragmatically, the effectiveness of the
available policy solutions. It would therefore seem useful to explore further parallels between public choice theory and the surrounding constitutional legal framework.
41
Here, even traces of the Cooley doctrine’s legacy may be noticed. In Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, the Supreme Court proclaimed that state actions should be judged in the light
of their constitutional desirability to permit diverse regulatory responses to local needs.
Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851). Reversely, the state rules were determined
constitutionally undesirable on issues of federal scope, such as interstate commerce. See
also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1048 (3rd ed. 2000).
42
New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
43
See id.
44
Marit Vestvik, Green Roofs, NAT’L INST. FOR CONSUMER RESEARCH (SIFO), available at
http://scp-knowledge.eu/og/housing-workshop-documentation [http://perma.cc/5T3R-W6MG].
45
Esty & Geradin, supra note 34, at 239.
46
Douglas T. Kendall, Federalism as a Neutral Principle, in REDEFINING FEDERALISM:
LISTENING TO THE STATES IN SHAPING “OUR FEDERALISM” 21, 24–25 (Douglas T. Kendall
ed., 2004).
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City-Level Environmental Law and Policy

Cities and municipalities in the United States may be active in
many areas of policy-making. This is a consequence of the federal constitutional structure of the country, which allows for local regulatory actions to
the extent that such actions have not been specifically precluded through
constitutional or statutory preemption. This allows development of state
and local policies, where on the federal level, conservative tendencies may
stifle action. A particularly conspicuous example in this respect is environmental policy, where active policy-making on the subfederal level has
been compensating for the lack of progressive environmental policies in
many fields.
In fact, the reasons for local level environmental policy are, as will
be shortly explained, precisely what the public choice theory would presume. The theory would also acknowledge that local environmental laws
have their critiques, limitations, and problems. There may be a mismatch
between the vast geographical scope of an environmental problem and the
constrained boundaries of the local jurisdiction, for example. Some claim
that the local political process is more susceptible to political pressure than
state or federal politics,47 or that it lacks in accountability.48 We refer also
to these issues below.
F.

Extended Producer Responsibility—a Boundary Case on Local
Level Environmental Policy

In order to fully adhere to the calls49 for empirically rigorous “public
choice and law” research that is “particularized to specific institutional
arrangements and actors,” this Article follows a case study approach that
focuses on a specific environmental policy approach: extended producer
responsibility (“EPR”). Traditionally, manufacturers bear the environmental responsibility for the impacts of producing the goods, consumers for
the usage-related consequences, and local governments bear the responsibility for the waste that results when products are discarded.50 With
47

See, e.g., Linda M. Malone, When Federal Initiatives Fail, in NEW GROUND: THE ADVENT
123, 135 (John R. Nolon ed., 2003).
48
See, e.g., James M. McElfish Jr., Learning from the Past and Looking Toward the Future,
in NEW GROUND: THE ADVENT OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 399, 406–07 (John R. Nolon
ed., 2003).
49
See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER AND ANNE JOSEPH O’CONNELL, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
PUBLIC CHOICE AND LAW 6–9 (2010).
50
Extended Producer Responsibility: A Prescription for Clean Production, Pollution
OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
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the advent of EPR, this division of roles is changing in many jurisdictions
and for many types of products. As of 2014, more than 380 EPR programs
have been established globally—over 120 of them in the U.S. alone.51 The
covered product categories include electrical and electronic equipment,
packaging, batteries, automobiles, tires, paint, and pharmaceuticals.52
The rationale behind EPR is quite straightforward: by assigning
producers the financial and/or physical responsibility for the management
of end-of-life products, the producers are assumed to internalize waste
management considerations into their product strategies.53 Rational producers would search for means to minimize their end-of-life management
costs and thus increase the recyclability of their products. This policy strategy takes its most conspicuous form when it expands the responsibility of
the producers to “take back” their products that are discarded.54
Large metropolitan areas and cities are, as noted, the salient units
of national economies for the production, consumption, and disposal of products.55 Cities have also played an important role in the emergence of EPR,
as the management of wastes such as discarded computers has increasingly drawn the attention of the public and policymakers.56 The traditional
Prevention and Zero Waste, GRRN (July 2003), http://www.grrn.org/page/epr-principles
[http://perma.cc/89NZ-FYBG].
51
Id.
52
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., THE STATE OF PLAY ON EXTENDED PRODUCER
RESPONSIBILITY (EPR): OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES (2014), available at http://www
.oecd.org/environment/waste/Global%20Forum%20Tokyo%20Issues%20Paper%2030-5
-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/2FSQ-8KTR].
53
Thomas Lindhqvist & Karl Lidgren, Modeller för förlängt producentansvar [Models for
Extended Producer Responsibility], in FRÅN VAGGAN TILL GRAVEN—SEX STUDIER AV
VARORS MILJÖPÅVERKAN [FROM CRADLE TO GRAVE—SIX STUDIES ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT OF PRODUCTS] 7 (Ministry of the Env’t ed., 1990), on file with author; Harri Kalimo
et al., Greening the Economy through Design Incentives—Allocating Extended Producer
Responsibility, 21 EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 274 (2012).
54
In the European Union, the end-of-life management of computers, consumer electronics
and, in fact, almost anything with a power cord, is today the responsibility of producers
under Directive 2002/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (“WEEE Directive”). See OJ L [2002] 37/24. In British
Columbia, a range of household hazardous wastes including spent pharmaceuticals, leftover paint, and lube oil, are managed by consortia of producers from relevant industries.
Ronald J. Driedger, From Cradle to Grave: Extended Producer Responsibility for Household Hazardous Wastes in British Columbia, 5 J. OF INDUS. ECOLOGY 89 (2001); Duncan
Bury, Canadian Extended Producer Responsibility Programs: The Shift from Program Roll
Out to Program Performance, 17 J. OF INDUS. ECOLOGY 167 (2013).
55
Pierre Desrochers, Cities and Industrial Symbiosis: Some Historical Perspectives and
Policy Implications, 5 J. OF INDUS. ECOLOGY 29, 29 (2001).
56
See E-Waste Recycling FAQs, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc
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means of dealing with non-point sources and solid waste—local land-use
regulations and waste management plans—are not well adapted to addressing the environmental impacts of more exotic waste streams such
as waste electronics.57 Managing such wastes can also be very expensive,
and hence strains local budgets. There are requirements for special handling, so the local governments have looked to new policy strategies both
to lower the cost of managing these wastes (e.g., design for recycling) and
to shift the costs to other entities (e.g., industry take-back).58 Thus, cities,
through organizations such as the U.S. Conference of Mayors,59 have been
strong proponents of federal EPR requirements. The role of cities in EPR
is not limited to support of national policies, however. New York City enacted a local law establishing extended producer responsibility for waste
electronics.60 King County, Washington and Alameda County, California
have established EPR programs for unused pharmaceuticals.61
Yet extended producer responsibility as a local level policy instrument has so far received only limited attention.62 It is not clear whether

.org/newyork/campaign-recycling-waste.asp [http://perma.cc/C5W9-HD7A] (last visited
Nov. 12, 2015).
57
See Jennifer Bradley, Federalism and Environmental Protection, in REDEFINING FEDERALISM: LISTENING TO THE STATES IN SHAPING “OUR FEDERALISM” 9, 11 (Douglas T. Kendall
ed., 2004)); Daniel C. Esty, Preface: The Next Generation of Environmental Law, in NEW
GROUND: THE ADVENT OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW xv, xv (John R. Nolon ed., 2003).
58
See generally Véronique Monier et al., DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDANCE ON EXTENDED
PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY (EPR) (2014) [hereinafter GUIDANCE ON EPR] available at http://
ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/pdf/target_review/Guidance%20on%20EPR%20-%20Final
%20Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/974E-M9BJ].
59
Supporting Extended Producer Responsibility for Products, Res. 61, 78th Annual U.S.
Conference of Mayors (May 28, 2010), http://www.usmayors.org/resolutions/78th_Confer
ence/resolutionsfull.pdf [http://perma.cc/9CJ5-5R4E].
60
New York, N.Y. Res. 1300-2008 (Mar. 26, 2008), http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/Legislation
Detail.aspx?ID=448112&GUID=9AF9CF41-2A3F-4CEB-AF98-48E89AD7CA73&Options
=&Search= [http://perma.cc/58EX-KALF] (to amend the administrative code of the city
of New York, in relation to the collection for recycling, reuse, and safe handling of electronic
equipment in the city of New York). The law was repealed after a state law mandating
EPR for waste electronics was enacted.
61
King Co., Wash., Proposed Rule BOH 13-03.1 (June 5, 2013), http://www.kingcounty
.gov/healthservices/health/BOH/resolutions/~/media/health/publichealth/documents/boh
/BOHResolution1303.ashx [http://perma.cc/N26V-RVYF]; ALAMEDA CO., CAL., ORDINANCE
CODE ch. 6.53 (2015), https://www.acgov.org/aceh/safedisposal/documents/SDD_Ordinance
.pdf [http://perma.cc/W2JB-HNUA].
62
It is important to distinguish the role of local governments as policymakers establishing
EPR much as state and national governments do from local governments as participants
in EPR systems providing collection and related services. See, e.g., GUIDANCE ON EPR,
supra note 58. It is the former and not the latter role that is the subject of this Article.
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EPR is well suited for local level policy-making, and if so, under what circumstances. It is clear, however, that it is a policy that is part of long-term
economic development. The shifting of the financial responsibility from
tax payers to the producer, as well as the manner in which the producer
may or may not be able to channel the ensuing costs to various other
stakeholders such as the consumers, distributors, and waste handlers, may
also entail reallocation of costs in ways that will be explained in more detail
below. Although the implementation of EPR necessitates a legal commandand-control framework, EPR has at its core a market-based mechanism
for creating incentives for proper environmental behavior: responsibilities
for end-of-life management are shifted to producers in order to make it
financially desirable for them to produce products with environmentally
improved performance.63 It thus seems conducive to both economic and
environmental policies.
Further, EPR is an environmental product policy because it deals
with the end-of-life treatment of goods through a life cycle-based approach.
In today’s interconnected global society, products are developed, manufactured, assembled, distributed, sold, (re-)used, recycled, and discarded
across multiple jurisdictions. The involved product and waste streams are
therefore intrinsically linked to interstate trade. Local EPR as a policy that
is at the same time facially interjurisdictional makes for a very interesting
boundary case for this Article’s analysis of the relationship between constitutional trade law and public choice theory at the local level because it so
clearly entails extrajurisdictional impacts. Overall, the diverse and casespecific nature of the public choice explanations64 calls nonetheless for
care in trying to expand the EPR-specific findings towards general ex ante
predictions about the limits of local level environmental law and policy.
I.

FORMAL AND INFORMAL LIMITS TO LOCAL AUTONOMY

A.

Formal Limits to Local Autonomy in the Constitutional System
of the United States

The constitutional system in the United States carefully protects the
powers and independent democratic processes of the fifty states through
the reserved powers doctrine of the Tenth Amendment.65 Local level governments, however, are not at all mentioned in the federal Constitution.
63

Whether this has in fact occurred is a separate question. See, e.g., Kalimo et al., supra
note 53. The issue at hand is the use of this strategy by local governments.
64
See Revesz, supra note 11.
65
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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Local autonomy, “Home Rule,” grows out the state constitutions, and is
also directly constrained by them.66 The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled
that local governments only exist by virtue of the state constitutions: the
municipal subdivisions “are created as convenient agencies for exercising
such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them
in [the state’s] absolute discretion.”67 If the language of state constitutions
delegating powers to the local level authorities is not express and unambiguous, any doubts tend to be resolved against local authority.68 Many
state constitutions do contain general home rule provisions, and numerous
states have enacted statutes that delegate important authority to local
authorities on specific issues.69 Local authorities are therefore usually
permitted to raise funds within their jurisdictions and to also spend such
funds locally.
On the other hand, a local law receives in many respects the same
treatment under the federal constitution as do state laws.70 Local laws
are pre-empted by state (or federal) laws along the principles established
by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution: the state statute may
expressly pre-empt local laws, the state statute may exhaustively occupy
a field of law, or the local laws may be preempted because of an irreconcilable conflict with the superior state law.71 Perhaps the most important
constitutional limitation to local powers beyond the Supremacy Clause,
in particular from the perspective of the economy, is that local measures

66

David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, Defensive Localism: A View of the Field from the
Field, 21 J.L. & POL. 261, 261–62 (2005).
67
Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 607–08 (1991); Richard Briffault, What
about the “Ism”? Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1303 (1994).
68
John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law, in
NEW GROUND: THE ADVENT OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3, 11 (John R. Nolon ed., 2003);
see, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. XI; N.Y. MUNICIPAL HOME RULE LAW § 36-a.2.10 (McKinney
2011) (granting the local authorities the power to enact laws relating to the protection of
their physical and visual environments). Even states with strict delegation of powers to
their localities, such as Georgia and North Carolina, may have specific provisions to permit
the adoption of local environmental laws. Nolon, supra 64, at 18.
69
Barron & Frug, supra note 66, at 263.
70
HARRI KALIMO, E-CYCLING-LINKING TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE EU AND
THE U.S. 360–61 (2006).
71
U.S. CONST. art. VI; see, e.g., Philip Weinberg, Overcoming the Preemption Problem, in
NEW GROUND: THE ADVENT OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 147, 148, 152–60 (John R.
Nolon ed., 2003); Harri Kalimo, Reflections on the Scope and Pre-emptive Effects of Community Legislation—a Case Study on the RoHS Directive, in THE YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 157 (Thijs F. M. Etty & Han Somsen eds., Vol. 5, 2005); see also
TRIBE, supra note 41, at 1175–76.
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cannot hinder interstate trade by discrimination or otherwise creating
obstructions to trade.72 The constitutional rules to solve this kind of
interstate trade disputes are in the United States enshrined in the Dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. The Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine applies also to local measures that impede interstate trade, just as it applies
to state measures.73 The task of controlling purely intrastate trade between
localities falls, however, on the state constitution and authorities alone.74
The Supreme Court noted in the interstate commerce case Fort Gratiot:
“[a] State (or one of its political subdivisions) may not avoid the structures
of the Commerce Clause by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce through subdivisions of the State, rather than through the State
itself.”75 There thus are formal federal constitutional limits to the powers
of local authorities to conduct policy.
In the legal practice, the precise scope of the powers granted to state
and local authorities vis-à-vis the central government has over time varied
considerably depending on the United States Supreme Court’s approach
on federalism76 at a given time.77 The court’s case law does not appear to
present any consistent, generally applicable principles from which to determine the vertical division of powers. Rather, the distribution between the
central and subordinate levels has, in practice, tended to vary depending
on the type of issue at stake. Important to this Article, it is often claimed
(and critiqued) that especially in interstate trade cases, the Supreme Court
has taken a particularly centralist position.78 Lower level authorities’ policy
72

For a discussion on the distinctions between different types of interstate trade questions,
see infra Part II.
73
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 430 (4th ed. 2011).
74
See, cf. id., at 430.
75
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 361
(1992).
76
Federalism in this Article refers to the constitutional division of sovereignty in general,
not to the notion of a more centralized government.
77
In the research of Kendall and others, the states seemed to be in a rather broad consensus
over the issues on which the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence had been too strict, on which
it had been too loose, and on which it had been quite opportune. Douglas T. Kendall, The
Voice of the States: An Overview, in REDEFINING FEDERALISM: LISTENING TO THE STATES IN
SHAPING “OUR FEDERALISM” 61 (Douglas T. Kendall ed., 2004).
78
Indeed, Kendall claims that over the past three decades, out of the sixty-one Dormant
Commerce Clause cases, fifty-six have been filed by a private party rather than a discriminated state. Thirteen out of these sixty-one cases have been filed and/or supported by
states and/or localities. Moreover, during the past fifteen years, even the states being discriminated against have taken a stand in support of the defendant, i.e., in favor of the state
that is discriminating against them. Not a single state has supported the striking down
of a state law on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds during these fifteen years. Douglas
T. Kendall, Limiting State Experimentation Under the “Dormant” Commerce Clause, in
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options are severely limited for the fear of interfering with the proper
functioning of the United States national market. However, according to
many observers, the Court has since the 1990s been on a “federalist
revival,”79 which to these observers means a devolution of powers from the
central towards the subordinate levels of government.80 This would mean
less strict formal limits on the local authorities’ ability to make policy.
Considering how formal constitutional law links to the city authorities’ ability to construe urban policy, it appears next (in Part I.B) useful
to further analyze Peterson’s theory on the informal limits of city policies,
and to assess how the heuristics resonate with those of interstate trade
law, including prominent interpretations of such law by constitutional law
scholars such as Laurence Tribe and Donald Regan (Part III).
B.

Informal Limits to Local Autonomy—Economic Development
and Redistribution

Whereas constitutional law sets formal limits on local powers in
the ways described above, Peterson’s City Limits81 is precisely a description
of the significant informal forces that also exert pressure on the local authorities. Urban public policy is explained by intermunicipal competition
between cities,82 each with their own independent powers and objectives.83
Peterson elaborates his claim about the limits of local policy by
dividing local urban policies into three general categories: those that
promote economic objectives (“developmental”), and those that have either a negative (“redistributive”), or neutral (“allocational”) impact on the
economy.84 It is worth noting that Peterson indeed equates redistribution—
the redirecting of wealth to less well-off segments of the society for reasons of equity—with a negative effect on the local economy.85 Police and fire
protection are classic examples of allocational policies; public goods and
services are delivered in ways that are developmentally and distributionally neutral. Peterson later merged allocational policies to redistributive
policies,86 and the same approach is followed here.
REDEFINING FEDERALISM: LISTENING TO THE STATES IN SHAPING “OUR FEDERALISM” 79
(Douglas T. Kendall ed., 2004); Kendall, supra note 77, at 61–64.
79
Bradley, supra note 57, at 9.
80
Id.
81
See generally PETERSON, supra note 16.
82
Id. at 4. For other reasons, see infra Section 1.1.
83
Barron & Frug, supra note 66, at 265.
84
Paul E. Peterson, Devolution’s Price, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 111, 112–13 (Mar. 1996).
85
See PETERSON, supra note 16.
86
PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 66–71 (1995); see also Peterson, Devolution’s
Price, supra note 84, at 112–13.
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The (regulatory) competition between the local authorities leaves
them in Peterson’s view no other choice but to pursue the supreme interest
of economic development (productivity) within their own jurisdictions.87
The localities’ behavior may therefore not only, and sometimes not at all,
be constrained by the fact that the local authorities were approaching the
limits of their formal constitutional powers. The behavior is limited much
earlier by the need to attract private investment, labor force, citizens, and
corporations within the state-designed structure in place.88 Because of
these limits, Barron and Frug have concluded that instead of local autonomy, local authorities possess what could be called limited powers.89 The
formal boundaries of law enforce the notion by serving as the ultimate border, which cannot be transgressed even where the policy objectives called
for it. Barron and Frug suggest that in order to preserve what remains of
their limited powers, the localities have engaged in “defensive localism”
against centralizing forces.90
Peterson’s categories deserve a closer analysis, however, and environmental policies can be used as an example to explore them further.
The protection of the environment is primarily a non-economic objective
with repercussions from local to the global level. The short-term impacts
of many environmental measures on the economy, industry in particular,
may often be neutral or negative. Stricter air pollution standards on production facilities or vehicles, extended responsibilities for producers to take
back their own products at the time of discard, or requirements to conduct
detailed environmental impact assessments prior to projects all entail
costs of various sorts, which will in the short term generally negatively
influence economic development.91
Yet environmental policy is often claimed to have positive impacts
on economic development, if the longer-term effects are emphasized

87
PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM, supra note 86, at 66–71; see also Peterson,
Devolution’s Price, supra note 84, at 112–13.
88
Barron & Frug, supra note 66, at 266; PETERSON, supra note 16, at 22–38. We leave aside
here the question of whether the local authorities may or should be divided further into
“cities” and “suburbs”. According to Barron and Frug, the distinction no longer is as sharp
as it used to be, and in particular not relevant for our focus on the city level. Barron & Frug,
supra note 66, at 268.
89
See Barron & Frug, supra note 66.
90
Id.
91
Peterson lists collection of waste and refuse as an allocational activity. As noted, he later
merged allocational policies into the redistributive ones and EPR has more implications
in this discussion with respect to assignment of financial burdens than with respect to
service provision. PETERSON, supra note 16, at 4.
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instead.92 The well-known work of Porter and van der Linde argued for
a link between environmentally progressive companies and their competitiveness already in the mid-1990s.93 The lively debate that has continued around this topic shows well how it may be difficult to make clear
distinctions94: what seems a drag on the economy today may or may not
turn out to promote economic development at a later point in time. The
internalization of the environmental costs (“externalities”) through the
application of the polluter pays principle and often reallocates the environmental costs from the anonymous general public to targeted parties in the
value chain with, one hopes, the result that the polluting party’s behavior
changes to the benefit of many interests.
The dynamic nature of the societal policies themselves also needs
to be taken into account in assessing Peterson’s categorization: at different
times and in different places, environmental policy may be either developmental or not. Moreover, in a more detailed analysis, a single policy such
as a local extended producer responsibility scheme would seem capable
of both enhancing economic development and the reverse, depending on
the policy elements within it. Take-back and recovery obligations on specific end-of-life products may boost the local recycling industry and reduce
local taxes because of the reduction in the cost of municipally delivered
waste services and thus may be attractive to businesses and residents. At
the same time, the responsibilities on local retailers to take back and separate different kinds of products for further treatment by municipalities
could be a burden to the local economy. Much will in practice depend on
the details of each individual measure.95
The above example shows why redistributive societal policies tend
to be left to the national authorities.96 The local authorities are likely to
be reluctant to impose taxes directly on locally situated corporations’
profits.97 A higher tax could risk driving the companies in question into

92

See, e.g., id. at 65.
Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Green and Competitive: Ending the Stalemate,
73 HARV. BUS. REV. 5, 120 (1995).
94
See, e.g., STEFAN AMBEC ET AL., THE PORTER HYPOTHESIS AT 20: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION ENHANCE INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS? (2011); Daniel C. Esty &
Michael E. Porter, Industrial Ecology and Competitiveness: Strategic Implications for the
Firm, 2 J. OF INDUS. ECOLOGY 35 (1998).
95
See Harri Kalimo et al., What Roles for Which Stakeholders under Extended Producer
Responsibility?, 24 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT. ENV. L. 40, 51 (2015).
96
PETERSON, supra note 16, at 68–69.
97
Id. at 75.
93
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lower-tax jurisdictions. This would work against the objective of economic
development, so that under a regulatory competition approach, the local
authorities would be unlikely to enact such higher tax regimes. The logic
of the events would also squarely explain the level-playing-field argument
that speaks for the constitutional model of harmonization. In upward
harmonization, the tax levels are made uniform on a higher level across
the federation.
C.

Informal Limits to Extended Producer Responsibility

But even this view of the categories appears too simplistic. With
modern product-related environmental measures, such as extended producer responsibility law, the situation may be quite complex. These kinds
of rules may be unfriendly to some businesses, yet the local authorities
actually are happy to engage in them. The difference stems from the geographic distribution of the economic and environmental impacts. Because
product-based environmental measures are typically applied in the jurisdiction where the products are sold, many of the parties selling there cannot escape the measures by simply shifting their physical location to a
different jurisdiction.98 An importer is caught in the same manner as is a
local producer. In fact, the situation is reversed: whereas the beneficiaries
(e.g., the citizens) of the cleaner environment and of a lower municipal tax
burden are located within the regulating jurisdiction, the companies burdened by product-related environmental measures may well be located
mostly, or in the global economy even exclusively, elsewhere.
There may also be differences between the various economic
operators. It could be in the local authorities’ economic development interests under an extended producer responsibility approach to limit charges
on retailers—who are likely to be local economic operators—with the cost
of managing returned waste products. Instead, the local ordinance could
also allocate that part of the responsibility to the manufacturers of the
products, located outside the local economy. If instead manufacturers were
local companies, public choice theory would suggest a different outcome:
take-back measures would target more the retailers than the manufacturers, because the former could not leave the jurisdiction without losing their
markets, while the latter could. The local authorities may hence attempt

98

Internet sales have recently emerged as a challenge to the use of EPR, potentially
altering some of the dynamics described here. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV.,
supra note 52, at 16.
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to externalize selected parts of the economic costs of waste management
to promote local economic development or at least to avoid the costs to
local taxpayers of achieving environmental goals. Product-related environmental measures, such as extended producer responsibility, may therefore export the burdens of regulation to other localities in markets where
producers are not local companies. These policies would be extraterritorial
in their (negative) economic effects.
How and where exactly in the central and subordinate levels of
government to conduct economic development and related policies boils in
practice down to an assessment of the values and objectives of federalism.
Peterson’s application of public choice theory to the motives and limitations of the local operators can from this perspective be seen as an important part of the picture on federalism.99 If Justice Brandeis saw in 1932
the states as the laboratories of democracy,100 another Justice, Stephen
Breyer, has noted more recently that federalism aims at granting the
citizens a degree of control and a sense of community in today’s interrelated and complex world.101 Federalism can increase the citizens’ satisfaction in politics. This is in fact the essential “neutral value” of federalism
according to Kendall.102 Briffault103 notes that local government offers
particularly good opportunities for democratic participation. The smaller
the community, the tighter is the sense of community. This enhances participatory decision-making—and vice versa. Local authorities may manage issues that are beyond the resources and awareness of the state and
federal authorities.104
Yet, coming back to Peterson, to what extent does such a sense of
control or satisfaction reflect the realities of local decision-making? Indeed,
Peterson stresses that exactly because of the strict limits imposed upon it,
local politics is not like state politics, nor is it like national politics.105 The
notion of control is weaker, as one is pushed by external forces to focus
99

See PETERSON, supra note 16.
New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
101
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 703
(1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
102
Kendall, supra note 46, at 21.
103
Briffault, supra note 67, at 1313; see also JOHN R. NOLAN, NEW GROUND: THE ADVENT
OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (John R. Nolon ed., 2003); Gerald E. Frug, The City as
an Economic Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980).
104
John R. Nolon, Introduction: Discovering and Evaluating Local Environmental Law,
in NEW GROUND: THE ADVENT OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW xxi, xxix (John R. Nolon
ed., 2003).
105
PETERSON, supra note 16, at 4.
100
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on economic development policies. Maybe the need to work within these
limits is a reason why local responses have been claimed to be flexible
and context specific.106 Environmental activists, industrial point source
dischargers, and taxpayers may, for example, at the local level form unexpected coalitions with municipalities going after the non-point source polluters, quite consistently with economic development objectives. Such
choices influence the overall regulatory system, however, and thus need
to fall within the boundaries of what is acceptable in terms of their effects
on interstate trade.107
II.

INTERSTATE TRADE LAW—THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

A.

Dormant Commerce Clause and the “Law of Prohibition”

The local authorities’ ability to legislate is also limited in a formal
way. The Dormant Commerce Clause in the U.S. Constitution sets legal
limits on cities’ ability to make policy. The case law on the Dormant Commerce Clause is nevertheless muddled, even sharply contested,108 and
scholars have interpreted it in different ways. Here, the Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is described from the viewpoint of general
trade law, dividing it into “law of prohibition” and “law of justification.”109
This approach highlights effectively the reconciliation between economic
and non-economic values, which in turn resonates interestingly with the
split into economic development policies and redistributive policies in
Peterson’s theory. In simplified terms, the clause can be seen as stipulating that local requirements must not hinder the access of imported products to the local market. The Supreme Court had heralded already 80
years ago:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every
farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce

106

Nolon, supra note 68, at 36.
Malone, supra note 47, at 135.
108
See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 207 (1994) (Scalia, J. &
Thomas, J., concurring); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U. S.
564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 68
(2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); United Haulers Ass’n., Inc. v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 348 (2007) (Scalia, J. concurring
in part), at 349 (Thomas, J. concurring).
109
See KALIMO, supra note 70, at 39–125.
107
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by the certainty that he will have free access to every market
in the Nation.110
The Dormant Commerce Clause can be understood111 as dividing local
measures into three types: facially (i.e., de jure) discriminatory measures
(Philadelphia v. New Jersey),112 de facto discriminatory measures (Dean
Milk;113 Washington Apple),114 or evenhanded measures with only incidental effects on trade (Pike v. Bruce Church).115 Seen in this way, the
Dormant Commerce Clause follows general trade law theory,116 which
roughly speaking merges the first two, discrimination-based, groups of
the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine so as to constitute the following
combination of tests: whether the rules discriminate or, if they do not,
whether they nonetheless create obstacles to trade.117
Under the “discrimination approach”, the judicial trigger for prohibiting local measures is that they discriminate between local and nonlocal products in interstate trade.118 Like products or processes are, on the
basis of their origin, not treated in interstate trade in an equal manner,
or unlike products are treated the same way. Any form of discrimination
from blatant, formal discrimination to subtle forms of “unintentional”
material discrimination may be included under the heading.119

110

The notions of non-discriminatory market access may be traced back to 19th century
cases. See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 107 (1994) (quoting Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 443 (1880)).
111
There are different ways to interpret and consequently to categorize the Supreme
Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause case law. For a detailed analysis, see KALIMO, supra
note 70, at 49–129, 641–58.
112
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
113
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
114
Hunt v. Washington Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
115
Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
116
There are two principal strands to trade law: the prohibition-justification approach
described here, as well as the so called aims-and-means tests. The analysis here is based
on the former approach.
117
See KALIMO, supra note 70, at 39–125.
118
Id.
119
Different (discrimination) tests have emerged as a consequence of a lively doctrinal
debate over the approach in applying the Dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Raymond
Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441 (1978) (outlining different tests). Often, the
prohibited discriminatory measures have been defined widely: “[T]he evil of protectionism
can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends.” City of Philadelphia v. New
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Under the “obstacle approach” the interstate trade regime goes
beyond the abolition of mere discrimination.120 It prohibits also evenhanded measures that simply make the importation of goods more costly
or difficult—even if the same measure equally obligated local producers
already on the market.121 From the perspective of a local government
setting up, for example, an environmental program, the formal constitutional limits on its policy choices therefore are tighter under an obstacle
approach to trade law than under a discrimination approach: if the application of the program renders the sales of an imported product more
onerous or costly, the scheme could be determined unconstitutional also
in the absence of discriminatory elements. Under an obstacle approach,
more latitude is thus given to protecting the marketplace when assessed
against the policies of the public authorities.
B.

Dormant Commerce Clause and the “Law of Justification”

The general theory of trade law described above has, however, a
second step: after the initial phase of prima facie prohibiting trade hindering measures follows a phase of justification.122 To the extent that a state
requirement is deemed prohibitive, as discriminating or creating an obstacle to trade, it may still be justified—like granting an exemption. The
rationale for such justifications is that societies should be able to promote
social values of such importance that they may indeed need to override
the economic interest of a smoothly functioning marketplace, which is the
trigger for the prohibition.123 Local measures that fall in the first Dormant
Commerce Clause group of facially discriminatory measures have extremely slim chances of being justifiable.124 Local measures in the Dormant Commerce Clause’s second group—those that are evenhanded in
text but discriminatory in practice—may in some cases be considered
justifiable.125 For the third group, i.e., of evenhanded measures, the

words of Justice Cardozo, “The Constitution was framed . . . upon the theory that the
peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not in division.” Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511, 523–24 (1935).
120
See KALIMO, supra note 70, at 43, 52.
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Id. at 52.
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presumption is reversed; they are justifiable unless a lenient test deems
them prohibited.126
III.

CITY LIMITS MEET THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

A.

Law of Prohibition

The specific question then arises, whether the seemingly libertarian Dormant Commerce Clause tests on prohibited and justifiable measures also affect the kind of policy that the local authorities may engage in
and how such impacts may compare with the theory of Peterson. Peterson’s
central category of “economic development” measures is often obviously
closely associated with interjurisdictional trade.127 But is economic development within the local jurisdiction best promoted by a liberal or a protectionist approach to interjurisdictional trade? Without the possibility to
here dwell on all the economic discourse on the benefits and disadvantages
of free trade versus protectionism, it may be noted that legitimate cases
for protectionism (e.g., infant industry argument) are few and far between.
On occasion the proponents of protectionism may have captured the political system so as to unfairly promote their economic interests. However,
if both Peterson’s claim on local, longer term economic development objectives and the economic theory of free trade hold, local measures would
indeed seem to have an inbuilt mechanism not to run afoul of open trade.
They appear to work toward removing protectionism and interest capture.
Legally speaking, there is little ambiguity in city policies which
would promote local economic development through discriminatory measures run counter to the classic prohibitions of trade law. Trade law doctrine will prohibit local policies to the extent that they would discriminate
against out-of-state interests.128 In other words, these are the earlier mentioned constitutional limits to the policies that a locality may employ. It
may not structurally favor local parties at the cost of importers.129
A more difficult and delicate question is facially neutral, but de
facto, discriminatory measures, as well as measures that are discriminatory neither in law or in fact, but simply hinder trade in some entirely
126

See KALIMO, supra note 70, at 49–88, 641–58.
See PETERSON, supra note 16.
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See West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
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See, e.g., id. (explaining the revenue from a nondiscriminatory Massachusetts tax
regime on all milk sold by milk dealers in the state was redirected as a subsidy, which was
only available to local milk producers affected by the tax).
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incidental fashion (obstacle approach). The Supreme Court’s Dormant
Commerce Clause case law has set limits on local economic development
measures where, for example, the “necessary tendency of the statute is to
impose an artificial rigidity on the economic pattern of the . . . industry.”130
On the surface, it would appear that by giving precedence to an
unobstructed market place over, say, environmental policy, the obstacle
approach will automatically give preference to economic development as
suggested by Peterson.131 A local authority may not compete as effectively
for citizens and other resources with social policy arguments or other offerings that do not promote economic development because these regulations
may be constitutionally invalid. The informal forces constraining the local
authorities to economic development objectives would under this construction be prima facie supported by the formal limits of the constitution on
the enactment of socially motivated regulation. It is another matter that
such prima facie prohibited measures can subsequently be determined
constitutionally justifiable.
B.

Law of Justification

Indeed, if a measure is determined prohibited in the first, prohibition phase, there still follows the analysis on whether it may nonetheless
be approved in the next, justification phase of the trade law test. Thus,
should a measure to promote local economic development (à la Peterson)
be considered prima facie prohibited by trade law, or could it nonetheless
qualify as, or contribute to, a legitimate objective so as to be determined
justifiable?
Economic grounds have had poor chances of being considered
acceptable justifications for trade restricting measures.132 How could they,
if the notion of unfettered competition underlies the entire trade law
logic? The Court has clearly stated that a state is without power to prevent articles from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the
grounds that they are required to satisfy, for example, local demands for
employment.133 The fact that the mere economic development concern of
creating employment opportunities does not usually survive as a legitimate concern in Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny is worth underlining,
because jobs are usually the key economic development concern of any
130

Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403–04 (1948).
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elected local official. Using extended producer responsibility again as an
example, the prospective jobs, created in the labor-intensive manual waste
dismantling and recycling processes, would not stand as a defensible reason for justifying the establishment of extended producer responsibility
under a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.134 In order to survive the
constitutional scrutiny, it thus would need to be established that the local
job creating measures in fact stand on other, sound justification grounds.
In an extended producer responsibility scheme, the objective of protecting
the environment e.g., by reducing virgin material extraction, lowering the
impact of production through the use of recycled materials, and avoiding
incineration and landfilling, could qualify as such grounds.
From the perspective of linking the trade law analysis to Peterson’s
theory, one would then need to determine whether the emphasis on environmental, as opposed to economic development considerations, would influence the measure’s qualification as an “economic development measure,”
and perhaps exclude it from development measures under Peterson’s categorization? In other words there would seem to be an inherent conflict at
the justification phase of the trade law test, but Peterson claims that
cities are structurally pushed to implement measures that promote economic development.135 However, if cities restrict interstate trade in any
fashion, these kinds of local measures are unlikely to survive a Dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny. To put this more simply: the likeliest kind of
local measures in Peterson’s theory (i.e., the economically grounded ones)
are amongst the least likely to survive a trade law justification test.
There are two important qualifications to this construction. First,
as implied above, from a longer-term free market perspective, economic
development policies may be structurally unlikely to be discriminatory or
trade-restrictive to begin with. They would be unlikely to fall under the
first, prohibition phase of the scrutiny. Economic development, from this
perspective, is and indeed should be pursued through a nonprotectionist
agenda, including when the measures are (partly) environmental. This
would save them from the constitutionality scrutiny from the outset. And
if trade law tests help in distinguishing the protectionist local (environmental) measures that promote economic development from the nonprotectionist (environmental) economic development measures, constitutional
law will indeed promote the long-term economic development of the locality.
134

In a similar fashion, the Carbone court focused on the fact that the principal aim of the
flow ordinance was to ensure the profitability and thus the continuity of the waste facility.
See C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994).
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See PETERSON, supra note 16.
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Another question worth posing is, assuming that the promotion
of economic development is indeed the deterministic general reasoning
behind local policy-making, whether such an objective would necessarily
translate into uniform, predetermined policy measures when implemented
in different localities. Peterson appears to claim that despite the many
conflicting political views, the “structurally supreme objective” of economic
development leaves the local authorities little choice.136 If extended producer responsibility proves to be the superior way of dealing with a particular waste management issue from the perspective of the economic
development of the locality—perhaps because it externalizes a waste cost
to producers located beyond the municipality’s borders—all local authorities are under external pressure to follow the strategy.
Trade law may in this respect work in parallel with Peterson’s
thinking. In the justification phase of a constitutional challenge, it namely
needs to be established whether there exists any other measures that are
equally effective in reaching the social objective, but that are less restrictive in terms of interstate trade.137 This “least restrictive measures” analysis will promote the choice of the measure that, presuming the long term
economic advantageousness of open trade, will lead to the most positive
economic development. In other words, the justification test serves as the
second frontier in distilling economic parochialism from the policies without making a judgment on the societal objectives of the policy itself. A particularity of the Dormant Commerce Clause is that the leniency of these
justification tests seems to vary depending on whether the measure is considered facially discriminatory, de facto discriminatory, or evenhanded.138
Extended producer responsibility policy as an economic development
policy is, viewed in terms of Peterson’s theory, not informally limited, nor
is it formally limited by trade law as long as it does not restrict trade
more than other, environmentally equally effective alternative measures
necessarily would do.139 It is important to note that the least restrictive
measures test should presume that the alternative measures reach at
least the same level of environmental protection. For example, a proven
ability of an EPR system to create an incentive on the producers to improve the environmental design of the products140 could constitute an
environmental protection standard that is difficult for alternative waste
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management measures to meet. EPR could also offer the only workable
means of achieving a particular recycling (high) rate. The number of available alternatives could hence be limited.
C.

Political Representation

There are further interesting links between Peterson’s theory and
trade law, which the example of EPR illustrates. In addition to the obstacle and discrimination approaches, as well as their combinations,141
to trade-restricting measures, there namely also exists a fourth prong of
trade law: the “political representativeness” tests.142 In these tests, the
focus is on the malfunctions in the political process that created the local
regulation in question.143 Protectionism is assumed to exist, if the group
of interests against whom the measure works, was under-represented in
the local regulatory process leading to the measure.144 Tribe claims:
[B]ehind the [Supreme] Court’s analysis stands an important doctrinal theme: the negative implications of the
Commerce Clause derive principally from a political theory
of union, not from an economic theory of free trade. The
function of the Clause is to ensure national solidarity, not
necessarily economic efficiency.145
The political representativeness approach depicts free interstate trade
as a fundamental political right of those that are a part of the common
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The combinations are sometimes called typological approaches. See, e.g., MIGUEL
POIARES MADURO, WE THE COURT—THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION 35–58 (1998); Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of the Common Market Place: Text and Context in the Evolution of the Free Movement of Goods, in THE
EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 349, 358 (Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca eds., 1999).
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See KALIMO, supra note 70, at 78–86.
143
Id.
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This was the core of the intellectual theses of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stone, laid
by him and building upon case law in the 1940s. See United States v. Carolene Products,
304 U.S. 144 (1938); see also Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1160–61 (1985).
The existence of the general theme has been accepted, yet by no means uncritically. See,
e.g., TRIBE, supra note 41; Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause,
1979 WIS. L. REV. 125 (compare with his later, more critical analyses).
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TRIBE, supra note 41, at 1057 (emphasis in the original). Tribe, nevertheless, goes on
to point out that the Court has, in several recent opinions, espoused the language of the
“free market” as the underpinning of the Dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 1058.
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union.146 The interests of out-of-state actors fall under constitutional
protection within the union through the Dormant Commerce Clause.147
All parties must have a representative way of participating in the discourse regarding the substance of the local measures that affect them.148
All the relevant stakeholders should have a voice in the discussions: producer, retailer, and consumer viewpoints would be crucial to any consideration of extended producer responsibility laws.
So is Tribe’s statement on the political nature of the American
union and Dormant Commerce Clause more specifically contradictory to
Peterson’s economically grounded theory? If Peterson’s claim—that interjurisdictional competition actually determines the content of the policy,
regardless of who is deciding and under what political agenda—holds,
would it mean that the political representativeness strain of trade law
theory is misguided? It does not matter, that is, how representative the
process is, because the local decisions are driven by economic development. At least Peterson seems to collate the political and economic strands
of the reasoning, when he claims that the structural role of the local lawmakers is, within certain limits, to promote and protect the interests of
their own constituents. In other words, economic parochialism cannot as
such be characterized as a malfunction in a locality’s political process149—
it may be a logically flowing implication of the economic development policies that the locality promotes.
D.

Local/Global Equivalence

Peterson’s theory seems to resonate in this respect well with
Regan’s approach to the Dormant Commerce Clause. Regan’s economically based thesis is namely that in most cases, the local interests represented in a political process will protect the foreign interests equally well,
even if they are not consciously considered.150 Regan calls this local/global
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equivalence: this leads him to assume that the local legislator is better
positioned to optimize overall local interests than a federal institution
would be.151 Therefore, in trade law disputes, the federal courts should not
interfere with the local measures at all unless there is clear evidence of
discrimination (or other malfunctions).152 In the absence of discrimination,
the local legislature together with the market forces, will optimize regulatory policy from the viewpoint of efficiency.153 The reason for this accords
with Peterson’s theory: because the local authority must pursue economic
development, it cannot afford to do otherwise.154 Local legislation cannot
afford to be parochial, because parochialism protects ineffectiveness. This,
Regan concludes,155 shows that protectionism completely undercuts the
representation theory.156
It would seem that in cases where the local legislator or regulator
has indeed determined the economic (and other, e.g., environmental) consequences of a measure correctly, and enacted rules in an evenhanded
manner, Regan’s theory may well hold. But it seems less clear how Regan’s
analysis accords with national-level economic considerations of whether
a measure, effective in view of an individual operator or the local level, is
also effective from the perspective of the entire union. If the economic burden predominantly spills over outside of the locality, is the interest representation still neutral and ubiquitous? Using the example of extended
producer responsibility will decision-makers give due weight to the absolute costs of a non-resident producer in collecting and separating waste
if they decide to shift from a tax-funded municipal waste collection system to such a privately funded model? Doubts may further be raised on
whether such local economic development policies will lead to optimal, or
even acceptable, solutions in terms of aggregate welfare in the state and
federal economy.157
Some federal supervision thus may occasionally be necessary—
even if the questioned measure may appear non-discriminatory, and even
if it had followed a seemingly unbiased process. It is not contested that
this sometimes leads to difficult value judgments. But if an out-of-state
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participant to a local market feels that there is an unwarranted hindrance,
and that the market is therefore no longer working efficiently from the
perspective of local, state or national-level economics, should there never
be a case for a judicial trade analysis of the importer’s concern? That does
not seem justified, and could also be contradictory to the local economic
development goals on the longer term. A requirement to label a product
in a city-specific fashion for end-of-life take-back could be an example,
although non-discriminatory and potentially efficient on city-level, the
fragmentation created by the multitude of similar environmental labels
could create considerable inefficiencies for producers’ and waste handlers’
systems on the national level. A careful analysis by the federal judiciary
seems meritorious in determining whether or not the local labeling requirement is excessive from a national perspective because there may
exist less trade restrictive alternatives to reach the city’s environmental
objective.158 On the other hand, the Court should avoid challenging the
political judgment that the environmental objective itself represents: a
strict proportionality test that juxtaposes the environmental benefits with
the trade hindrance is merited in extreme cases only.
E.

Eclectic Approach

Peterson reminds us that his theory does not advocate a complete
renouncing of the other strains of local political theory such as the doctrines of power structures, pluralist decision-making, and invisible political
elites.159 A more convincing portrait of the local political landscape emerges
when various (public choice) doctrines may be combined together.160 Similarly it would appear that, in drawing the formal constitutional limits,
a complete abandonment of the political representativeness theory of
trade law is not called for despite the above criticism, and even if much
of Regan’s reasoning were followed. The representativeness theory may
be applied in conjunction with the discrimination and obstacle trade law
tests to refine the picture.
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CITY-LEVEL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY-MAKING IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY

The political-economic theory of Paul E. Peterson describes “informal” limits on city level policies.161 Parallel to the “informal” limits are
constitutional law limits of a more “formal” kind.162 Overall, that paper attempts to provide insights on whether these informal and formal limits
to city-level policies prevent the cities from having an active role in environmental policy-making.163 The overall conclusion of the paper’s study
on the boundary case of extended producer responsibility is that, at least
in the context of EPR, such informal and formal limits are not overly
constraining.164
One of the main presumptions of Peterson in City Limits was not
to confuse localities for nation-states, but instead acknowledges the specific external constraints of local politics.165 However, it would seem that
the distinction between the local authorities and nation states has shrunk
considerably during the thirty years since City Limits was written. Cities
and large metropolitan areas increasingly dominate national economies.166
This has not come to mean, however, that local authorities’ external limits
to act have become any lesser—they have not. As many cities have grown
into international actors, the informal, political city limits are now drawn
on a global map. The tentacles of the global economy now extend their restrictive effects also to nation-states’ ability of independent policy-making.
The large metropoles and nation-states are equally directed by a relentless
drive for superior competitiveness. This makes interpretations of Peterson’s
theory regarding local authorities’ limits acute and relevant. Because application today, in assessing the limits to modern societal policies, such as
extended producer responsibility, on many different levels of governance.
Considering the shrinking distinctions between cities and nationstates in terms of public choice, there would intuitively appear to be little
reason for a differentiated approach in terms of the constitutional Dormant
Commerce Clause analyses. The fact that cities have become global players only reinforces this thought, because the economic imperative of free
trade is essentially of international pedigree itself. For example, the rules
of the U.S. internal market are to a large extent similar to those of the
161
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WTO and EU.167 A scrutiny of the local measures should follow the tenets
of, theories such as, non-discrimination and non-protectionism, free interjurisdictional mobility, or a common national market. These principles
have been defended by judicial progressives and conservatives alike in
terms of the Dormant Commerce Clause.168 This Article shows how an understanding of the local economics and politics, which Peterson’s theory
illuminates, helps in achieving these overarching principles. Judicial intervention can be efficient and effective; to mute unhealthy tendencies in the
city-business relationships, while preserving the city’s ability to fill in gaps
in environmental policy-making.169
CONCLUSIONS
A.

City Limits Meet the Dormant Commerce Clause—Experiences
from the Viewpoint of EPR

So what is the relationship between EPR—a paradigmatic case of
modern environmental law at a local level—and Peterson’s theory and the
Dormant Commerce Clause? Overall, cities would seem rather uninhibited from the perspective of Peterson’s theory or the Dormant Commerce
Clause to actively drive EPR. Discrimination of non-local producers in favor
of local producers is not inherent in, nor a prerequisite for, successful EPR.
The Courts have followed a lenient view in allowing non-discriminatory
local environmental measures. Subfederal jurisdictions are also usually
allowed to enact laws where the benefits of such laws fall unequally between different vertical levels of the value chain, even if the local industry
would be predominantly on the benefitting level.170 Such laws have not
been considered unconstitutional.171 Similar vertical aspects in the division of the extended producer responsibilities thus do not appear to render
167
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EPR particularly or inherently vulnerable to a Dormant Commerce Clause
challenge. Any extraterritorial impacts of EPR are, in line with recent case
law on the matter,172 too indirect and obscure to have relevance for a local
ordinance’s constitutionality. EPR does not normally dictate a specific process or production method for a product, for example.
Neither does Peterson’s vision of the informal limits to city policies,
created by stakeholders voting with their feet, seem dispositive to the outcome of our analysis in terms of EPR. By making producers responsible
for end of life management of products, a city shares the burden of waste
management between local residents and businesses across the globe.
Should an EPR scheme however be implemented in a clearly protectionist manner—which, as stated, EPR itself does not in any way endorse or
necessitate—it would appear to go against Peterson’s rationale. Economic
development cannot in the long term be promoted by protectionist policies. Vice versa, if a local economic development measure (à la Peterson)
contains interstate trade distorting protectionist elements, its probability
of surviving a Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny is low. Economic criteria are usually ineligible as grounds of justification. Only essential noneconomic social objectives qualify as justifications. It may at first sight
seem awkward that economic development measures, which are the privileged type under Peterson’s theory, are amongst the least likely to survive
a trade law justification test. This is nevertheless, on closer scrutiny, not
problematic because sustainable economic development may—and indeed
should—be in any event pursued through a nonprotectionist agenda.
Otherwise, both the economy and the environment end up worse off.
While the Dormant Commerce Clause mainly acts as a means to
root out protectionism, could its practical application also raise issues in
terms of non-discriminatory measures? Certain procedural handicaps do
need to be acknowledged. First, the industrial interests that have triggered
the trade concern may be backed by superior financial resources. This may
influence the parties’ ability to engage in, and to win, a legal battle in
cases of non-discriminatory measures.173 Furthermore, the allocation of
172
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the burden of proof in cases may influence the outcome. Once the plaintiff
importer has proven an obstacle to trade exists, it is for the defending city
or state to show that the environmental concern justifying the measure
is legitimate. After that, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to allege
that the non-discriminatory local measure taken to address the concern
is clearly excessive and not the least trade-restrictive alternative available. Because it is often so demanding to scientifically prove that a particular measure, in this case an alternative to EPR, is unequivocally equal
(or better) in terms of the environment, the party bearing the burden of
proof is in a weaker position. This is usually the fate of the importer, and
could be so even in cases involving facially discriminatory local measures.
Determining the exact allocation of the burden of proof may however be
intricate and case specific.174
B.

Combining Theories for a Wiser Practice

Obviously the highly complex practical circumstances of many
current societal issues tend to make fully accurate, normative, and predictive generalizations about the fate of city level environmental measures in judicial cases challenging.175 Indeed, perhaps the most important
implication of the parallels identified in this analysis between Peterson’s
theory and the Dormant Commerce Clause is that, while they do not seem
to constrain cities’ ability to environmental policy-making, they can offer
mutually supportive insights on the judicial and political value reconciliation conundrums that such city level decisions may entail. The parallels
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between trade law’s justification test and Peterson’s theory are particularly
clear in the determination of whether there exist any local measures,
which offer an equal level of environmental protection, but with less tradeconstraining effects. These “least restrictive measures” tests will guide
policies into a positive direction in terms of economic development, in particular considering that the tests appear to be more lenient for evenhanded
measures than they are for de jure or de facto discriminatory measures.
However, the tests should not limit the societal objectives of the policy
itself. When properly applied, the tests do not affect the city’s choice in
terms of the level of environmental protection it chooses. Instead, it focuses
on the means of reaching that level with as little intrusion to trade as
possible—which is in fact only a means of rooting out origin-based discrimination or avoidable hindrances—yet does not imply that intrusions as
such are prohibited.
C.

Thinking Under the Box

The intersection of public choice theory and legal doctrine is both
interesting and important. There are, however, also concrete reasons to explore the limits to the environmental policy-making prerogatives of cities.
And it is not just the ongoing political stalemate at the national level in
the United Sates that prompts a careful look at these questions. Notably,
more than half of the world’s population now lives in urban areas, so the
growing role of cities in the world economy and in climate-related policy
motivates this analysis. We chose to investigate the role of a type of environmental policy that differs from the classic interest of local governments
in land use and basic public health. EPR is interesting in that respect
because it reflects the prioritization of preventative measures over endof-pipe approaches; it leverages life cycle thinking,176 and it exemplifies
the move from command and control towards economic and informational
policy instruments. All this promises more flexibility in achieving a given
set of policy objectives.177 The rising importance of cities and evolving
approaches to environmental policy make the nature of cities’ limits and
possibilities for thinking under the box compelling.
176
Life cycle thinking refers to analysis, management and policy on a cradle-to-grave basis
and incorporates both life cycle assessment (“LCA”) and life cycle management (“LCM”).
177
Naoko Tojo, Extended Producer Responsibility as a Driver for Design Change—Utopia
or Reality? (Sept. 2004) (Ph.D. dissertation, Lund University) (on file with The International Institute for Industrial Environmental Economics, Lund University) available
at 212.113.88.1/att/literature/2004_Extended%20producer%20responsbility_Tojo.pdf [http://
perma.cc/375A-3JG7]; see also KALIMO, supra note 70.

